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Abstract
We present a model of communication network formation in which links’
strengths are endogenously determined by individual incentives. Agents are en-
dowed with a fixed amount of resource which they can distribute as they want in
directed links. Individuals capture benefits from both direct and indirect access
to others, in a way that takes into account the strength of each link. The wheel
architecture is shown to be the unique efficient and stable architecture under
mild restriction.
JEL Classification Numbers: D85, C70
Keywords: Directed Communication Network, Endogenous Link Strength, Efficiency,
Stability
1 Introduction
The growth of communication good industries, such as the Internet, mobile phones
and computers, and more generally all numeric goods, raises new economic issues
∗The author is at GREQAM, Universite´ d’Aix-Marseille, 2 rue de la Charite´ 13002 Marseille,
France.
†I wish to thank F. Bloch for many valuable discussions and comments about this work.
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related to the formation of communication networks. At least two major queries are
unavoidable: how do communication networks evolve through time? Do they maximize
some collective outcome? One key aspect is that network formation is not supervised by
any formal institution; rather, individuals decide whether to contribute to the shaping
of such networks. This is therefore important to understand the individual incentives
to join such networks. A second key aspect is that in many cases agents choose how
much effort to devote to communicating in the network, and the level of investment
in two distinct connections is not necessarily homogenous. For instance, as visiting
your favorite web sites, you may decide how much time to spend on each, and in many
circumstances you would not choose an homogenous distribution of time. That is, the
link strength (as measured by the level of time, effort, money) is often endogenous to
individual decisions. Third, many networks are directed. For instance, this may fit
situations like visiting a web site, but consider also the (directed) relationship in a firm
between a manager and a subordinate. With regard to non directed networks, a generic
difference govern the formation of connections: in the latter case link formation is a
bilateral action, while in the former case it is a unilateral action. Put differently, the
coordination problem inherent to the non directed case vanishes in the directed case.
We address the three points in a simple model of network formation. This model
complements Bloch and Dutta (2005)’s work on non directed network, so our setting
is close to theirs. First, agents have a fixed and infinitely separable amount of resource
that they can distribute over links. This may represent some effort, time or money
spent in each relationship. Second, agents capture indirect benefits from accessing
others, and this benefit depends on the level of investments made by intermediaries. We
suppose that if there is a (directed) path linking agent i to agent j, the value for agent
i stemming from that path is a function of the investments made by all intermediaries
on that path; and we assume that the benefit she obtains from agent j is the greatest
value among all possible paths of finite length. In that context, we show that the wheel
network is the unique efficient and stable (Nash) architecture. Our resource-constraint
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environment is therefore sufficient to generate a unique architecture making compatible
private incentives and collective outcome. This remarkable coincidence between Nash
and efficient networks is inherent to our resource-constraint environment. In our setting
agents prefer to concentrate their allocation on the partners who provide them with
the greatest indirect benefits. This results in the formation of the unique architecture
such that agents access others through a chain of maximal length and composed of
weights equal to amount X. We also present two basic extensions: we first propose a
more general setting in which the results keep true, then we set up a simple dynamic
process of network formation leading to the wheel architecture with probability 1.
This work can be related to studies devoted to the formation of communication
networks1, or to enlarged context of directed network formation2. Among them, we
discuss the closest articles.
Our contribution can be seen as an extension of Bloch and Dutta (2005) to directed
networks. Indeed, the authors study the formation of a non directed communica-
tion network with endogenous link strength. In their setting, agents have a budget
constraint and choose how much to invest in each relationship. Also, players obtain
indirect benefit by the path maximizing the product of link strength (in the main
part of the paper). The difference between the models is the following: in Bloch and
Dutta’s work, links are non directed and the value of a link depends on the level of
investment exerted by each partner (investments are either substitutable or comple-
mentary). That is, link formation exhibits an intrinsic coordination problem which
vanishes in our directed context. The authors show that substitutable investments
promote the efficiency and stability of the star architecture, while complementary in-
vestments promote that of connected architectures (especially, the circle architecture is
always stable and efficient for small populations). The reason why connected networks
1See for instance Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Bala and Goyal (2000), Deroian (2003), Bloch and
Dutta (2005), Kim and Wong (2006), Matsubayashi and Yamakawa (2006).
2See Dutta and Jackson (2000).
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emerge in that latter context is that in a tree, any two end-node agents have always
an incentive to coordinate and invest part of their resource (the part exceeding the
investment of their current partner) in the formation of a new link.
The second related paper, the discussion of which is presumably of first interest, is
the one-way flow model of Bala and Goyal (2000). In this model agents form directed
connections and obtain benefit from both direct and indirect access to other agents.
But the resource scarcity inherent to our context induces a clear distinction: in the
one-way flow model (without decay), any agent connected to a component receives a
benefit written as a function of the number of agents in the component, whatever the
structure of the component. This favors multiple individual best-responses and gives
rise to multiple Nash architectures. In contrast, in our context the very structure in
which agents are embedded matters and the structure of the game is sufficient to select
a unique Nash architecture.
To finish, Kim and Wong (2006) propose a directed communication model in which
agents get benefit from communicating with others. Two agents communicate with
each other whenever there exists a cycle in which both are inserted. When agents are
homogenous, the wheel architecture is uniquely determined by this solution concept.
Our model is very distinctive in its foundations: first we do not integrate link formation
costs, but rather agents invest a fixed amount of resource in links. Second, the endoge-
nous link strength is specific to our context. Last, in our model agents capture benefit
from accessing other agents, independently of whether or not others access them, i.e.
value creation is not related to path circularity.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. The next
two sections respectively present the three-player case and the general case. Section 5
presents two extensions and section 6 concludes. All proofs are presented at the end
of the note.
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2 The model
Let N = {1, ..., n} be a set of agents. Every agent is endowed with a finite amount
X ∈ [0, 1[ of resources that can be devoted to establishing and maintaining links.
Agents derive benefit from accessing other agents, either directly or indirectly. The
key distinction with Bloch and Dutta (2005) is that the return of the investment made
by agent i on agent j does not depend on how much agent j has invested on agent
i. Hence benefits are one-sided, in the sense that agents access others through valued
directed paths. A valued directed network represents the structure of allocations.
Directed networks and individual strategies. A strategy of agent i is a vector
with n − 1 coordinates xi = (xi,1, ..., xi,i−1, xi,i+1, ..., xi,n) where xi,j ∈ [0, X] for each
j ∈ N \ {i}, under the constraint that ∑j 6=i xi,j ≤ X. Agent i forms a link with j if
xi,j > 0. The set of strategies of agent i is denoted by Xi. The set X = X1 × ...×Xn
is the space of strategies of all agents. A strategy profile x = (x1, ..., xn) can be
represented as a directed and valued network g. We denote by G the set of (non
negatively) weighted directed networks. The link xi,j > 0 is depicted as an edge
between agents i and j with arrowhead pointing at agent j, and we denote by ij this
directed and valued link for convenience when there is no confusion; thus ij ∈ g means
that xi,j > 0, ij /∈ g means that xi,j = 0. A path between agent k0 and agent kp is
a sequence of links k0k1, · · · , kp−1kp without loops and such that
∏q=p−1
q=0 xkq ,kq+1 > 0.
The distance from agent i to agent j, and denoted d(i, j; g), represents the length of the
shortest path from agent i to agent j in the network g. By convention if there is no finite
path length the distance is infinite. We notice by dmax(i; g) = maxj 6=i,d(i,j;g)<+∞ d(i, j; g)
the largest among all finite distances from agent i to others in the network g.
Individual payoffs. In agreement with the literature on communication networks,
we assume that the benefit of an agent in a network is given by the sum of the benefits
she receives from accessing every other agent in her component. The benefit b(i, j; g)
that agent i captures from accessing agent j is the maximal value of the product of
5
link strength over the set P (i, j; g) of all finite paths from agent i to agent j:
b(i, j; g) = max
p∈P (i,j;g)
xia1 · · ·xam−1j
with the convention that b(i, j; g) = 0 if there is no finite path from agent i to agent j
in the network g. Note that the value of any path is less than 1. Agent i’s payoff in
the network g is finally written pii(g) =
∑
j 6=i b(i, j; g). In this formulation individual
payoffs are additive with respect to the benefits obtained from each accessed agent.
Efficiency and stability. The welfare W (g) of a network g is the sum of individual
payoffs on that network, i.e. W (g) =
∑
i∈N pii(g). A network is said efficient if there is
no other network such that the sum of individual payoffs exceeds that of the former, i.e.
W (g) ≥ W (g′) for all g′ ∈ G. Further, we apply the usual Nash criterion: a network is
Nash if for every agent, her current strategy is a best-response to the current strategies
of all other agents. Formally, a profile of individual strategies x∗ = (x∗1, · · · , x∗n) is a
Nash equilibrium of the game if and only if, for every agent i ∈ N , for every strategy
xi ∈ Xi, pii(x∗i , x∗−i) ≥ pii(xi, x∗−i).
3 The three-player case
There are 16 architectures with three agents. Let us begin with efficiency issue. The
welfare value of network architecture g is the maximum welfare that can be obtained
on that architecture over all possible allocations. An efficient network basically satisfies
that every agent invests her total resource X over her partners (‘no waste’ condition).
The following notation will be useful: sometimes, the best allocation is such that certain
agents reduce the weight of some link to zero; that is, the best alternative consists in
modifying the architecture. If z represents the value the architecture asymptotically
tends to, we will notice W (g) → z (and not ‘=’). This means that the value is not
reached by this architecture although its value tends to that. This precludes de facto
this architecture from being efficient.
Figure 1 depicts the 16 architectures with three players and gives their values: The
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Figure 1: The 16 three-player architectures and their values
only efficient architecture is the wheel (labeled g13 in the table), whose value isW (g
1
3) =
3X + 3X2.
Let us turn to stability analysis. Given that there is no link formation cost, a Nash
network basically satisfies that each agent forms at least one link; then we restrict
attention to networks containing at least 3 links. Furthermore, for each agent in a
Nash network, the sum of all direct benefits equals X (no waste). Hence, a Nash
strategy maximizes the indirect benefits that the agent can capture.
7
• 3-link architectures: the wheel g13 (in which each link’s weight is X) is Nash: indeed,
for each agent the payoff isX+X2, while any distribution of allocation (x,X−x), x > 0
(the amount x is invested on the link on which she currently invests X) would induce
a payoff equal to either X or x(1+X) (depending on X −x ≶ xX). The architectures
g23 and g
4
3 are not Nash, as one can identify one agent forming no link. Also g
3
3 is not
Nash, as some agent (that with one inward connection) finds profitable to replace her
current link with one entailing the formation of the wheel.
• 4-link architectures: none is Nash. In g14 the agent with two links is better off by
investing all on the link such that the deletion of the other link entails the formation
of the wheel. In g24, note that the two symmetric agents (forming one link) invest X on
their current connection, while the agent with two links shares her allocation into two
parts. Therefore, the indirect benefit of a one-link agent is less than X2. By replacing
her link with a connection (of weight X) toward the third agent provides her with an
indirect benefit equal to X2. In g34 the agent forming two links is better off by investing
all in one link (benefiting therefore from indirect benefit). Last, in g44 one agent does
not form any link.
• the 5-link architecture: g5 is not Nash; some agent (that forming two links and with
one inward link) finds profitable to cut the link with the agent who do not form a link
with her.
• the 6-link architecture: g6 is not Nash; investing all on a single agent is strictly
beneficial, since a positive benefit is in that case obtained from the agent at distance
two.
To sum up, our environment exhibits no tension between stability and efficiency in
the three-player case.
4 The general case
Our first result pertains with efficiency. We will use the following lemma:
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Lemma 1 For every agent i in a network g, pii(g) ≤
∑dmax(i;g)
k=1 X
k.
Considering any agent i in some network g, lemma 1 guarantees that her payoff does not
exceed that obtained by some agent starting a chain of length dmax(i; g) and composed
of links with weights equal to X. The reason lies in the resource-constraint nature of
our model. When the individual resource constraint is saturated, forming an additional
link requires to decrease the investment put over some current links. This entails the
following result: whatever a given set of paths of length k issued from some agent i, the
sum of their values cannot exceed that of one unique path of length k and composed of
maximal weights. The following proposition derives the set of efficient architectures:
Proposition 1 The complete wheel is the unique efficient network.
Our first conclusion is that a unique architecture is socially desirable. Indeed, this
architecture is such that all agents access others by the means of a chain of length n−1
and composed of links of weight equal to X (when all individual resource constraints
are saturated). Since no finite distance can be larger than n − 1, we use lemma 1 to
conclude that no individual payoff can exceed that obtained in the wheel architecture.
Uniqueness is derived by remarking that the wheel is the unique architecture such that
all agents can obtain that maximal payoff (one can even see that whatever a distinct
architecture, at most one agent can obtain such a payoff).
Our second result ensures that there is no tension between stable and efficient
networks. Indeed,
Proposition 2 The complete wheel is the unique Nash network.
The proof relies on two points: First, we consider one agent with maximal payoff on
the network, say agent i, and one agent at maximal distance from her, say agent j;
noticing that agent j is not critical for agent i, we derive that (i) agent j’s payoff is not
smaller than that of agent i, and (ii) for obtaining equality, agent i’s payoff must be
exactly equal to
∑dmax(i;g)
k=1 X
k (we know from lemma 1 that it cannot be greater). We
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deduce that for each non terminal agent on the path from agent i to agent j, she invests
amount X in a unique connection. Second, we notice that if some agent say p is not
accessed by agent i, then a possible strategy entails for agent p a greater payoff than
that of agent i, a contradiction. We deduce that agent i observes all agents. Combined
with the first point, we see that to join agent j, agent i begins a chain of n − 1 links
with weight equal to X. We conclude that agent j’s unique best response is to invest
amount X on agent i. The complete wheel is therefore uniquely selected.
Hence, a unique architecture is selected3 and there is a coincidence between efficient
and stable networks. This result is in sharp contrast with the one-way flow model of
Bala and Goyal (2000). The authors obtain in their benchmark case (without fric-
tion) that the complete wheel is both Nash and uniquely efficient, but many other
architectures are also Nash (in their model Nash networks are minimally connected).
Let us go back to our proof and see why the results of the two models diverge. In both
models a Nash network is connected. In BG, in a connected network all agents observe
all others, so they obtain the same gross benefit. That is, payoff differences only stem
from distinct number of costly connections. This is not the case in our context, in
which links are valued. This generates the following major distinction: consider some
agent i with maximal payoff and agent j at maximal distance from agent i (thus not
critical to her). In both models, if agent j forms a unique link with agent i, she obtains
the same payoff as agent i (hence, in both models at least two agents - i.e. agents
i and j form a unique connection). But in BG, the fact that agent i’s payoff is not
smaller than that of agent j does not impose the existence of a chain from agent i to
agent j: connectedness is sufficient. This originates the multiplicity of Nash networks.
In our resource-constraint setting, different connected architectures generate different
3The result on stability is basically robust to stability criteria allowing for collective deviations,
like strong Nash equilibrium (Dutta and Mutuswami [1997]) or Strong stability (Jackson and van den
Nouweland [2005]). Indeed, we know that (i) the wheel architecture ensures to all agents the maximal
individual payoff and (ii) for any distinct architecture at most one agent obtains such a payoff.
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payoffs. The only compatible network must contain a chain of maximal length from
agent i to agent j (and maximal weight X on each arc), otherwise the presence of
multiple branches lowers too much agent i’s payoff, contradicting that her payoff is
maximal.
5 Extensions
5.1 A more general setting on the value of paths
We define the set Ψl(i, j; g) of all paths of length l from agent i to agent j in the
network g:
Ψl(i, j; g) = {(xa0a1 , · · · , xal−1al) ∈]0, X]l/ak 6= ak′∀k 6= k′, a0 = i, al = j}
This formulation excludes paths containing some arcs of weight equal to zero. Then
we define a function  φl : Ψl(i, j; g) −→ R+(xia1 , · · · , xal−1j) 7−→ φl(xia1 , · · · , xal−1j)
with l arguments in ]0, X], and generating a positive real number: φ(z1, · · · , zl) > 0,
i.e. a path (composed with positive weights) has positive value. Second, we suppose
that the function is increasing and (weakly) convex in each argument. By convexity,
we mean that for every indexes l and p:
φl(a1, · · · , ap, · · · , al) + φl(a1, · · · , bp, · · · , al) ≤ φl(a1, · · · , ap + bp, · · · , al).
The benefit obtained by agent i from agent j is written:
b(i, j; g) = max
l=1,··· ,n−1
max
p∈Ψl(i,j;g)
φl(p)
with the convention that b(i, j; g) = 0 whenever there is no finite path length from
agent i to agent j. For instance, the individual payoff in the complete wheel is written
n−1∑
k=1
φk(X, · · · , X︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
)
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Indeed, there is a unique finite path from agent i to any agent j, and no two paths
have equal length. Note that in this formulation we do not impose any ranking on the
functions φk, we only impose positivity.
Among all paths starting from agent i and issuing to agent j, we denote with P ∗ij(g)
the subset of them with greatest value, i.e.
P ∗ij(g) = {pij(g) ∈ argmaxΨ1(i,j;g),··· ,Ψn−1(i,j;g) φl(p)}.
For convenience, we arbitrarily select a unique best path, say Θ(i, j; g) ∈ P ∗ij(g). We
denote for each agent i in the network g the profile P ∗i (Θ, g) = {Θ(i, j; g)}j 6=i. This
profile associates with each agent j 6= i one path from i to j of greatest value. We
define the set Γli(Θ, g) composed of the paths in P
∗
i (Θ, g) of length l. Then, convexity
implies the following lemma (this lemma is a direct extension of lemma 1):
Lemma 2 For every index l ∈ {1, · · · , n − 1}, and whatever selection process Θ, we
have: ∑
p∈Γli(Θ,g)
φl(p) ≤ φl(X, · · · , X︸ ︷︷ ︸
l times
)
This lemma bounds above the sum of benefits that agent i captures from accessing
agents placed at a given finite distance from her. To fix ideas, consider agent i’s payoff
in the following network (see figure 2):
Figure 2:
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In this example P ∗ij(g) is reduced to a unique element for any j 6= i. We obtain:
pii = φ1(a) + φ1(X − a)
+φ2(a, b) + φ2(a,X − b) + φ2(X − a, c) + φ2(X − a, c′) + φ2(X − a,X − c− c′)
+φ3(a, b,X) + φ3(X − a, c,X)
As the function is increasing, φ3(a, b,X) ≤ φ3(a,X,X)φ3(X − a, c,X) ≤ φ3(X − a,X,X)
Further, the function is convex, so
φ1(a) + φ1(X − a) ≤ φ1(X)
φ2(a, b) + φ2(a,X − b) ≤ φ2(a,X)
φ2(X − a, c) + φ2(X − a, c′) + φ2(X − a,X − c− c′) ≤ φ2(X − a,X)
That is,
pii ≤ φ1(X) + φ2(a,X) + φ2(X − a,X) + φ3(a,X,X) + φ3(X − a,X,X)
Using again the convexity of φ2 and φ3, we obtain
pii ≤ φ1(X) + φ2(X,X) + φ3(X,X,X)
Hence, confirming lemma 3, we note that for each distance l = 1, 2, 3, the sum of
benefits that agents i captures from agents placed at distance l from her is bounded
above by the value φl(X, · · · , X).
The following lemma extends lemma 2:
Lemma 3 Whatever network g ∈ G distinct from the complete wheel, there is at most
one agent with payoff equal to
∑n−1
k=1 φk(X, · · · , X). Hence at least n− 1 agents have a
payoff strictly smaller than that they obtain in the wheel.
As a direct consequence of lemmata 3 and 4:
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Proposition 3 The complete wheel is both Nash and uniquely efficient.
Uniqueness (of efficiency set) comes from the fact that the complete wheel is the unique
architecture providing φk(X, · · · , X) from k = 1 up to k = n − 1 as benefit to all
agents. Hence, we observe that a crucial determinant of uniqueness is that all functions
φk(X, · · · , X) are positive.
We obtain uniqueness of the stable set under the following more specific environment:
φl(xia1 , · · · , xal−1j) = θ(xia1)× · · · × θ(xal−1j)
with function θ(.) : R+ −→ [0, 1[, increasing and convex, and such that θ(x) > 0 iff
x > 0. For instance, consider the function θ(x) = δ ·x, δ ∈ [0, 1] and x ∈ [0, X], X < 1.
We obtain here a geometric decay function, in the sense that the value of a path
(xia1 , · · · , xal−1j) is δl · xia1 × · · · × xal−1j.
The additional result obtains:
Proposition 4 In such a specification, the complete wheel is the unique Nash network.
Indeed, when φ is a product of identical functions, the proof of proposition 2 is easily
extended.
5.2 A dynamic process of network formation
We present a dynamic process close to that presented in Bala and Goyal (2000) and
pursued with slight modification by Kim and Wong (2006). We consider some initial
network g0 ∈ G and a discrete time sequence 1, · · · , t, · · · At each time t, a strict
and non empty subset At of agents is stochastically drawn from the population; the
selected agents i ∈ A play with probability 1 a weakly payoff-improving strategy; this
includes possibility of playing the same strategy as the current one. The resulting
network is labeled gt. In our process, the new strategies are payoff-improving, but
not necessarily best-responses (in BG they are such). In terms of individual informa-
tional requirements, our hypothesis is less demanding than that of BG (the authors
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have also developed in a working paper some analysis under alternative informational
assumptions - see footnote 22 pp. 1192 in the related article).
The following result obtains:
Proposition 5 This dynamic process converges with probability 1 toward the wheel
architecture, regardless the initial network it starts from.
The result is close to that of Bala and Goyal (2000) (or even Kim and Wong [2006]).
Yet, our proof contains a difference inherent to our context, although similar in spirit.
In BG, the proof relies on the following mechanism: starting from any initial network,
choose some agent j1 with maximum profit on it, consider some agent j2 furthest away
from her (at maximal distance), and let agent j2 form a unique connection with agent
j1. This strategy is a best-response: agent j2 observes all the agents observed by agent
j1 while forming a unique connection. Then replicate the process by replacing agent j1
by agent j2 and by finding some agent at maximal distance from agent j2. The process
goes on until achievement of the wheel. In our context, starting from any network,
choose some agent j1 with maximum profit on it, consider some agent j2 furthest away
from her, and make agent j2 invest all resource X on agent j1. Then she obtains at
least agent j1’s payoff, and consequently she weakly improves her current payoff; now
because links are valued, this new strategy may not be a best-response: indeed, she
obtains exactly X +X(pij1(g)− b(j1, j2; g)) from the new strategy. It is easy to find a
network containing another agent j′1 with maximal payoff, and such that both agent j2
is furthest away from her and b(j1, j2; g) > b(j
′
1, j2; g).
6 Concluding remarks
We study a non-cooperative model of network formation in which agents invest a
fixed and infinitely separable amount of resource into links. That is, the strength of
links is endogenously determined by individual investment decisions. In this resource-
constraint setting, we find that the wheel architecture is both uniquely efficient and
15
uniquely Nash. Therefore, this environment is sufficient to generate a unique architec-
ture making compatible private incentives and collective outcome.
Further advances may investigate some lines of research: introducing convex cost of
link formation generates an immediate trade-off between distance and cost. Relaxing
homogeneity in agents’ types may also constitute an interesting extension, as well as
introducing information asymmetry.
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Proof of lemma 1. The proof is given by induction.
Inductive argument P (k), k ∈ {1, · · · , n− 1}: if dmax(i; g) = k, then pii(g) ≤
∑k
q=1X
q.
We trivially have P (1). Suppose now P (1), · · · , P (k). We will derive P (k+1). Indeed,
if dmax(i; g) = k + 1,
pii(g) =
∑
j 6=i
xij(g) +
∑
j 6=i
xij(g)pi
i
j(g)
where piij(g) represent the relevant part of agent j’s payoff for agent i. That is, that
derived from agents distant until at most order k of agent j; if some agent p is at
distance k+1 or more than agent j, then either the distance is infinite and it does not
count for agent i’s payoff, or the distance is finite which means by construction that
agent p is at smaller distance from agent i (since dmax(i; g) = k + 1).
Since the relevant network used by agent i to access others through agent j is a tree
starting from agent j and with path length bounded above by k, we deduce as applying
P (1), · · · , P (k) to agent j (more precisely to the relevant part of agent j’s payoff for
agent i) that piij(g) ≤
∑k
q=1X
q. Hence,
pii(g) ≤
∑
j 6=i
xij(g) +
∑
j 6=i
xij(g)
k∑
q=1
Xq
And since
∑
j 6=i xij(g) ≤ X, we obtain that
pii(g) ≤
k+1∑
q=1
Xq
which proves P (k + 1). 
Proof of proposition 1. We notice that a link ij is not necessarily active in the
sense that the link is used to extract benefit. For instance, consider the following
three-player network such that x12 = X − , x13 = , x23 = X. Then agent 1 may join
agent 3 with two paths. And the two-arc path worths more than the one-arc path
whenever (X − )X > . This is true for sufficiently small values of . But in such a
case a more efficient network exists in which agent i reallocates the investment xij into
the connection xik1 where ik1 is the arc used by agent i to join agent j (each agent
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using the path ik1, ..., kpj to extract value would be better off, and no agent was using
the link ij to extract value by definition). Hence we can restrict attention to networks
such that for every agent, the sum of benefits associated with agents at distance 1 from
her is exactly equal to X.
From lemma 1 we easily derive that the complete wheel is efficient: in the wheel
architecture all agents access others by the means of a chain of length n − 1 and
composed of links of weight equal to X (when all individual resource constraints are
saturated). Since no finite distance can be larger than n − 1, we use lemma 1 to
conclude that no individual payoff can exceed that obtained in the wheel architecture.
We now derive uniqueness by showing that whatever network g ∈ G distinct from
the complete wheel, there is at most one agent with payoff equal to X + · · · + Xn−1.
Consider a network g distinct from the complete wheel. Suppose without loss that
pi1(g) = X + · · · +Xn−1. Then there is a chain, starting from agent 1 and containing
all agents, and all agents except the terminal node, say agent n, invest X on her link.
Thus, these agents have a unique connection. EITHER agent n forms a set of links
distinct from investing her total resource on agent 1; and clearly agents 2 to n obtain
less than agent 1’s payoff; OR agent n invests amount X on agent 1, in which case the
complete wheel forms. We deduce that the complete wheel is the unique architecture
such that all agents obtain a payoff equal to X +X2 + ... +Xn−1. We conclude that
the complete wheel is uniquely efficient. 
Proof of proposition 2. We notice that the wheel architecture with all weights equal
to X is Nash, since no other network can guarantee larger individual payoffs. We then
turn to uniqueness. We first show that some agent with maximal payoff begins a chain
composed of links of weight equal to X. Second we deduce that this agent accesses the
whole society. Third we conclude that the wheel is uniquely selected.
Assume without loss that agent i ∈ argmaxk∈Npik(g). Consider agent j such that
d(i, j; g) = dmax(i; g). Then agent j is non critical to agent i. Hence, if forming a
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unique link toward agent i, agent j obtains
pij = X +X(pii(g)− b(i, j; g))
since agent i’s payoff is not affected by agent j’s strategy. Recalling that agent i’s payoff
is maximal, we know that pij(g) ≤ pii(g), inducing X + X(pii(g) − b(i, j; g)) ≤ pii(g).
But b(i, j; g) ≤ Xdmax(i;g). Hence the latter inequality implies that:
pii(g) ≥ X
1−X
(
1−Xdmax(i;g)
)
or equivalently pii(g) ≥ X+X2+...+Xdmax(i;g). But by lemma 1 agent i’s payoff cannot
exceed that value. Thus it must be the case that pii(g) = X + X
2 + ... + Xdmax(i;g).
We also derive two points. First pij(g) = pii(g). Second, for agent i’s payoff to be such,
agent i accesses all others through a chain of length dmax(i; g) and composed of links
with weights equal to X.
Suppose that some agent p is not accessed by agent i, i.e. dmax(i; g) < n − 1. Then
by investing amount X on agent i, agent p obtains a payoff equal to X +Xpii(g). As
agent i’s payoff is maximal, it must be the case that X +Xpii(g) ≤ pii(g), which means
that pii(g) ≥ X1−X . But as X < 1, X +X2 + ...+Xn−1 ≤ X1−X , a contradiction. Hence,
dmax(i; g) = n− 1.
We know that there is a unique agent j such that d(i, j; g) = n − 1 and that pij(g) =
pii(g). Given that agent i begins a chain of length n − 1 and composed of links of
weights equal to X, the unique strategy for agent j to obtain agent i’s payoff consists
in forming a unique connection of weight X with agent i. The complete wheel obtains.

Proof of proposition 5. The proof is given by proposing from any network g0 a
sequence of individual beneficial deviations at each period, and leading to the wheel
network in a finite delay. We do not impose individual deviations to be best-response
strategies; rather we demand that the new strategy does not deteriorate the individual
payoff.
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Consider some initial network g0 ∈ G and some agent j1 ∈ argmaxk∈N pik(g0),
one agent with maximum profit on the network g0. Choose some agent j2 such that
d(j1, j2; g
0) = dmax(j1; g
0), so agent j2 is furthest away from agent j1 in the network g
0.
This may include the possibility that d(j1, j2; g
0) = +∞. Clearly, agent j2 is not critical
to agent j1 (dropping all links formed by agent j2 does not affect agent j1’s payoff).
Then by investing X on agent j1 in period t = 1, that is if agent j2’s new strategy is
x′j2 = (0, · · · , 0, xj2,j1 = X, 0, · · · , 0) and g1 = x′j2 ⊕ g0−out:j2 the resulting new network
(g0−out:j2 represents the network g
0 minus all links formed by agent j2), agent j2 gets
a payoff pij2(g
1) ≥ pij1(g0), so that the new strategy weakly improves agent j2’s payoff
(i.e., pij2(g
1) ≥ pij2(g0)) (it strictly improves her payoff in the case d(j1, j2; g0) = +∞).
Consider now the network g1. By construction, agent j2 ∈ argmaxk∈N pik(g1). Again,
consider some agent j3 such that d(j2, j3; g
1) = dmax(j2; g
1); equivalently agent j3 is
such that d(j1, j3; g
0
−in:j2) = dmax(j1; g
0
−in:j2), if g
0
−in:j2 denotes the network g
0 minus all
links pointing at agent j2 (again, it can be the case that d(j1, j3; g
0
−in:j2) = +∞). By
the same argument, assume that agent j3 is selected at time t = 2 and that she invests
all X on agent j2. Then she obtains at least the same profit, so her new profit is not
less than the maximum profit in g1, so this strategy is payoff-improving.
Computing the process further, we go through until selecting agent j1 in a finite time,
who similarly improves her payoff by completing the wheel architecture (no individual
payoff exceeds that obtained in the wheel).
The proof is completed by remarking that the wheel architecture is the unique absorb-
ing state of the process: first whatever network distinct from the wheel, at least one
agent can improve her strategy (since the wheel network is uniquely Nash). Second,
the wheel architecture is Nash strict; hence no agent in the wheel possesses another
strategy giving her an equal payoff. 
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